Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Security Vulnerability Prevention by Kommrusch, Steve
Artificial Intelligence Techniques for Security Vulnerability Prevention
Steve Kommrusch
steve.kommrusch@gmail.com
Colorado State University
Department of Computer Science
Fort Collins, CO, 80525 USA
April 2018
Abstract
Computer security has been a concern for decades
and artificial intelligence techniques have been ap-
plied to the area for nearly as long. Most of the
techniques are being applied to the detection of
attacks to running systems, but recent improve-
ments in machine learning (for example, in nat-
ural language processing) have enabled the op-
portunity to process software and specifications
to detect vulnerabilities in a system before it is
deployed. This paper presents a survey of artifi-
cial intelligence techniques (including machine
learning) to detect or repair security vulnerabili-
ties before product introduction. In the surveyed
papers, techniques are presented for using NLP
to analyze requirements documents for security
standard completeness, performing neural fuzz
testing of software, generating exploits to detect
risk, and more. We categorize current techniques
into 3 groups: vulnerability detection, vulnerabil-
ity repair, and specification analysis. Generally,
while AI techniques have become quite useful in
this area, we show that AI techniques still tend
to be limited in scope, providing a collection of
tools which can augment but not replace careful
system development to reduce vulnerability risks.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, machine learn-
ing, security, vulnerabilities, software
1. Introduction
Machine learning has been expanding in scope in recent
years to the point where meaningful natural language pro-
cessing (NLP), automated testing, and code analysis can be
utilized. Additionally, more tradition artificial intelligence
(AI) techniques such as support vector machines, genetic
algorithms, and inference engines can be applied to code
before it is used in a setting where it may be attacked. Using
artificial intelligence techniques to prevent vulnerabilities
from being introduced is a broad field and warrants an up-
dated survey paper to identify promising avenues of research
in this area.
According to Cybersecurity Ventures, 111 billion lines of
new software code are created annually worldwide (Ven-
tures, 2017). By utilizing automated mechanisms to aid
in detecting vulnerabilities before system deployment, a
product team can focus more on feature development and
performance. The large number of devices and applications
being deployed today both increases the risks of vulnera-
bilities to a networked system and also provides a large
collection of training data to use with artificial intelligence
techniques. As we discuss papers in this survey, we will
consider which areas of security vulnerability reduction
are most likely to benefit from further artificial intelligence
advances in the near future.
The broadest recent survey in this area reviews papers from
2008-2015 and explored how machine learning techniques
were being applied to broad security domains (Jiang et al.,
2016). Our survey differs from that work in 3 primary ways.
First, we will be including papers published as recently as
2018; second, we will be considering all artificial intelli-
gence approaches, not limiting to machine learning; and
third we will be focussed on vulnerability detection and
prevention, not attack detection or other security issues. An-
other recent survey paper is a student paper available on
arXiv and discusses the DARPA sponsored Cyber Grand
Challenge to detect, exploit, and/or repair vulnerabilities in
software (Brooks, 2017). We will discuss the results of these
surveys in more detail in sections 2 and 3. In our survey
we include some references that are not peer-reviewed (such
as the student survey but also publications from companies).
These references are provided in the spirit of giving a broad
understanding of the current work in this area.
There are many ways to organize an algorithm to use AI
with security, but figure 1, taken from one of our surveyed
papers (Wang et al., 2015), is useful for understanding many
common components. The figure identifies the input data
as audit logs, existing security access policies, and known
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Figure 1. Example learning system showing training inputs, learning components, and generated output. In this case, audit logs, access
patterns, and existing access policies are used as inputs to generate refined policies. (Wang et al., 2015)
access patterns. The learning algorithm in the figure uses a
nearest-neighbor classifier along with other components to
learn when policies should be loosened or tightened based
on the audit log information. The output of the system
refines the policies. This format of using training data to
develop an AI system which can then be applied to new
inputs is a general approach used by many of the papers
cited.
This paper is organized into 3 sections. Section 2 covers
techniques to detect vulnerabilities in source code or binary
code. Section 3 covers techniques to automatically repair
vulnerabilities in source code. Section 4 discusses tech-
niques to analyze security specifications to insure the future
code is correct or to check that access permissions match
the documentation. For each of the 3 areas, we will assess
what we consider the most promising avenues of research.
2. Vulnerability detection
Vulnerability detection is the problem of identifying vul-
nerable code sequences by analyzing source code prior to
deployment. Table 1 shows papers which use AI tech-
niques for vulnerability detection. Two of the papers focus
on Android apps and this highlights a primary reason for
machine learning in the security space (Peng et al., 2012)
(Rasthofer et al., 2014). Companies whose reputation de-
pends on their software quality are also making platforms
available to which large numbers of coders can contribute.
The ability to automatically process submitted applications
greatly reduces the overhead of quality assurance by trained
professionals.
Yamaguchi, one of the authors cited in the table, wrote fur-
ther about his techniques in his PhD thesis (Yamaguchi,
2015). His work combines a new parsing strategy with a
joint data structure of program syntax, control flow, and data
flow into a code property graph. This graph is embedded
into a vector space for use with machine learning algorithms
and mined for instances of vulnerable program patterns. For
his application, he found that supervised training for secu-
rity was not as valuable as unsupervised training based on
clustering. Yamaguchi was able to reduce the code need-
ing human review by 95% by focussing on dimensionality
reduction, anomoly detection, and clustering.
Two of our references in this category deal with Android
applications (Peng et al., 2012) (Rasthofer et al., 2014).
Given the large number of applications submitted for use on
Android platforms, automating any part of the security prob-
lem is valuable. One of these papers includes data showing
that malicious software frequently requests many more per-
missions than valid software (for example, only 2-3% of
valid applications request the READ SMS permission, but
almost 60% of malware requests it) (Peng et al., 2012). By
training a system to recognize the malware request patterns,
the 2-3% of valid applications are mostly classified as safe,
while the malware is detected. The other Android reference
compares their technique for detecting unsafe data leaks
to other dynamic taint analysis tools like Fortify SCA and
TaintDroid (Rasthofer et al., 2014). In taint tracking, one
monitors the flow of data between resources such as the file
system or network. The approach uses supervised training
to learn when privacy information such as location informa-
tion or address book data is leaked to risky destinations such
as certain web domains. Their code was able to find new
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Vulnerability detection
Reference Goal AI Techniques Comments
(Richardson
et al., 2010)
Limits of auto-
mated fingerprint-
ing for OS
Decision tree, rule
learner, SVM-SMO,
instance-based clustering
ML tended to overfit on unimportant differ-
ences in variants. Training data was fuzz
testing with candidate queries feeding into
a classifier.
(Peng et al.,
2012)
Score and rank
risks of Android
apps
Naive Bayes, Probabilis-
tic generative model
Analyzes GooglePlay apps and a Malware
dataset based on permissions requested
(READ SMS, ACCESS WIFI STATE, etc)
to create single risk score to simplify user
interactions.
(Rasthofer
et al., 2014)
Identify sources
and sinks from
code of any An-
droid API
Linear SVM Recognizes sensitive data sources and po-
tentially untrustworthy data sinks which
might leak data by analyzing source code.
(Mokhov
et al., 2014)
Identify bad cod-
ing practices
NLP, Modular A* Recog-
nition Framework
Analyze CVE code base for training exam-
ples of weak code and use model to identify
risk areas in source code.
(Yamaguchi
et al., 2015)
Infer vulnerability
search patterns in
C code
Complete-linkage clus-
tering
Detect attacker-controlled data attack to a
sensitive data sink. (Heartbleed is an exam-
ple). Constructs code property graph and
uses ML to reduce amount of code needed
to audit by 95%.
(Liu et al.,
2015)
Predict future
data leak in-
stances from
network logs
Random Forest Predict future organization breaches by
analyzing externally measurable network
features (misconfigured DNS, phishing
sourced from organization, etc).
(Blum et al.,
2017)
Improve fuzzing
of inputs
Neural network Fuzzing is a technique to provide crafted
malicious input to test a program for vulner-
abilities. This paper uses neural networks
to learn which areas in programs to attack
to test for vulnerabilities.
(Shoshitaishvili
et al., 2018)
Discover vulnera-
bilities in binary
code
Symbolic execution and
fuzzer
Searches for tainted input vulnerabilities.
Avoids path explosion of symbolic exe-
cution by intelligently combining it with
fuzzing techniques.
Table 1. Artificial Intelligence techniques addressing automatic detection of software vulnerabilities
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data destinations used by malware (sinks) in the Android
application set which were not previously on lists of sinks
for the ecosystem.
Microsoft has an enormous code base that must be main-
tained and developed with attention to security vulnera-
bilities. Fuzzing is a dynamic program technique which
mutates program inputs to find vulnerabilities that cause
crashes, buffer overflows, memory errors, and exceptions.
Long Short Term Memories (LSTMs) are used in recurrent
neural networks to facilitate learning patterns in time as well
as syntax structures in human or computer languages. Mi-
crosoft researchers used neural networks including LSTMs
to learn patterns from past fuzzing explorations to guide
future fuzzing mutations efficiently (Blum et al., 2017).
Crashing a system is a key measurement of fuzzing effi-
cacy and using their LSTM guided fuzzing technique Rajpal
et al., were able to find 37% more unique crashes than the
benchmark fuzzing technique they compared against.
Automating the processes of checking code for vulnera-
bilities is important. DARPA sponsored the Cyber Grand
Challenge to detect, exploit, and/or repair vulnerabilities in
software; and the Mayhem and Mechanical Phish (Shoshi-
taishvili et al., 2018) programs were the top 2 ranked sub-
missions. Both used symbolic execution to aid in the search
for vulnerabilities (Brooks, 2017). Symbolic execution is
a technique where input values are tracked symbolically
through a program, as opposed to running multiple test cases
with specifically chosen values for input parameters. Both
Mayhem and Mechanical Phish are designed to discover
exploitable vulnerabilities in binary code. Their techniques
can help uncover buffer overflow vulnerabilities, format
strings vulnerabilities, and general memory corruption vul-
nerabilities. However, neither winner is yet ready to be used
for large, complex systems and so further research in this
area is warranted.
Using NLP techniques on code has shown interesting results
(Mokhov et al., 2014). Mokhov et al. show how to teach a
language model what bad code looks like using CVE and
CWE cases and then use the trained model to identify sec-
tions of source code that match given vulnerabilities. They
build their system on top of MARFCAT, a machine learn-
ing code analysis application they also developed (Mokhov
et al., 2015). Their core NLP methodology includes 2 char-
acter n-grams with smoothing techniques, which means the
language is analyzed using these 2 character patterns but
with some adjustment made to smooth out the probabili-
ties for rarely seen tuples. With appropriate training their
model can work on binary code or source code in various
languages. MARFCAT learns known weaknesses by com-
puting various language models from the CVE-selected test
cases and then can compare these models to unseen code
fragments for vulnerability discovery.
We conclude this section with reference to a cautionary
paper. Remote operating system fingerprinting in order to
identify different OS versions usually requires manual effort.
Richardson et al. (Richardson et al., 2010) tested a previ-
ously published promising technique to eliminate manual
intervention. The new technique used an approach similar
to fuzz testing. They found that when tested on 329 differ-
ent machine instances the results with the new technique
were poor. They suspected the system overfitted to behav-
ioral differences that were not OS-specific and concluded
that manual expertise would still be needed for OS finger-
print generation. In general, many of the AI techniques that
show initial promise need to be tested in larger production
environments before being broadly deployed.
3. Vulnerability repair
The next step beyond detecting vulnerabilities is to attempt
automatic repairs with artificial intelligence techniques. The
goal of code repair is to learn from examples how to trans-
form vulnerable code into non-vulnerable code. As this
field progresses, millions of lines of legacy code could
be scrubbed to improve security very broadly. Even early
progress in this area can be very valuable. If a new class of
vulnerability is found (such as Spectre), training examples
of changing vulnerable code to protected code can often be
generated quickly (for Spectre, compiling Visual C++ with
older vs latest MSVC can create training cases (Microsoft,
2018)). Creating a automated system that can transform
code with the vulnerability to clean code can allow large
software repositories to be repaired efficiently.
Klieber and Snavely (Klieber & Snavely, 2016) use code
transformations to repair common types of bugs. For exam-
ple, access control is one of the top ten vulnerabilities in
the OWASP list (OWASP, 2017) and falls under CWE-285;
their approach uses a first order logic solver to prove access
controls are safe and will add appropriate conditions if it
is not. They analyze the code to determine the intended
(implied) access controls that should be available to the user
and can repair functions to limit access to only this implied
set. As an example from the paper, consider a collaborative
document viewing/editing system which allows documents
to be viewed by members of a team but only edited by the
author given normal UI access options. The approach taught
how to compute the intended access control policy as well
as the policy available to an attacker without restriction to
the normal UI interface. When an attacker’s access exceeds
the intended access, the codebase is repaired to provide the
proper limitation.
Another approach to program repair is to search for code
changes which pass security test cases (Le et al., 2017).
Le et al. use a domain-specific language for input along
with test cases and sets up a search space to find quality
repairs to bugs in code. The code is analyzed to find likely
lines at risk for bugs, adjust those lines to use symbolic
execution, and analyzes the symbolic execution given the
inputs and outputs provided for quality assurance. Bugs
which are found can then often be repaired to produce the
correct output given the input.
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One of our references is an example of a more specific
yet widely applicable use of AI for improving mandatory
access control (MAC) for Android (Wang et al., 2015). The
system uses audit logs from existing applications and semi-
supervised learning to train a network to generate improved
MAC policies as well as improved audit logs. The improved
audit logs can then be used to improve the MAC policies
further. Figure 1 is from this paper and shows how the
components of this system interact.
As an example of ongoing work in industry, we include an
article by Draper in this table (Draper, 2017). Heartbleed is
a famous security bug from 2014 involving buffer overflow
is the OpenSSL cryptography library. Using a neural net-
work trained on 170,000 C/C++ projects from GitHub, their
DeepCode architecture found and fixed Heartbleed bugs
when run on previously unseen programs.
4. Specification analysis
Advances in natural language processing have given re-
searches the opportunity to automatically process vulnera-
bility descriptions or product specifications to assess secu-
rity risks. In 2017, CVE logged almost 300 vulnerabilities
per week (CVE, 2018), which puts enormous burden on sys-
tem administrators to evaluate, prioritize, and patch critical
vulnerabilities. Bozorgi et al. (Bozorgi et al., 2010), use
machine learning to digest the CVE vulnerability labels and
descriptions and produce a single score that summarizes
both the exploitability of the vulnerability and its severity.
The goal is that the single score can be used by system
administrators to prioritize work on patches for new vul-
nerabilities. Their technique relies on an NLP technique
known as ’bag-of-words’. For example they record whether
particular tokens like ”buffer”, ”heap”, or ”DNS” appear
in specific text fields like ”title”, ”solution”, or ”product
name”. Their classifier is about 90% accurate, much more
so than the ’Exploitability’ score provided by CVSS.
To help address risk assessment in new mobile applica-
tions, WHYPER has been trained to recognize sentences
in a smartphone application description to infer the per-
missions an application should need (Pandita et al., 2013).
For example, if the application description includes ”You
can share the yoga exercise to your friends via Email and
SMS”, then this indirectly implies the application should
have the READ CONTACTS permission on the smartphone.
Applications which ask for permissions not implied in the
description to the customer could be classified as suspicious.
Our final paper in this category addresses the goal of finding
vulnerability issues in product specifications before code is
being written. Figure 2 shows the traditional cost of change
curve during software development. As discussed in the
introduction, many artificial intelligence techniques applied
to computer security are being applied at the production
stage - detecting attacks to running system by monitoring
traffic or logs. This paper aimed to highlight artificial intel-
ligence techniques that can be applied earlier in the design
cycle. In order to find security vulnerabilities before code
is even written, some researchers have looked at analyzing
security requirements documents (Malhotra et al., 2016)
(Hayrapetian & Raje, 2018). The earlier paper (Malhotra
et al., 2016) is structured as a proposal for an approach
to the problem. That paper notes that previous work to
detect requirement document problems focussed on ’weak
phrases’ and ’linguistic defects’. The paper proposes train-
ing a neural network on ISO security standards and using the
General Architecture for Text Engineering (GATE) to detect
problems. The paper proposes creating concept graphs and
comparing the ISO standards to the document in question.
For example, if the standards expect authentication to re-
quire a user ID and a password and the document only refers
to a user ID, then the graph comparison would detect the
missing password requirement and detect the error. The
later paper is by some of the same authors as the first paper
(Hayrapetian & Raje, 2018) and this paper provides results
of the approach comparing security documents to ISO and
OWASP standards. They were able to reach 89% accuracy
in determining the completeness of standard statements, in-
dicating a technique which could be a valuable tool for a
specification reviewer, but not yet a replacement for careful
review.
Figure 2. Traditional cost of change curve. Agile coding arguably
flattens this curve, but fixing bugs at requirements stage is clearly
the least effort. (Agile)
5. Future work
As computer hardware continues to improve and more pow-
erful artificial intelligence techniques are created, more such
techniques will be applied to the problem of software secu-
rity. To stay abreast of new developments, we recommend
watching for future publications by the authors and compa-
nies sited in this paper. Several of the frameworks proposed
yield promising but not yet productizable results, so further
work in the areas discussed is likely to be fruitful.
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Vulnerability Repair
Reference Goal AI Techniques Comments
(Wang et al.,
2015)
Semi-supervised
learning for
Android MAC
Nearest neigh-
bors(metric: semantic
connectivity between
known and unknown
subjects)
Analyzes access patterns from system us-
age to improve Mandatory Access Control
policies.
(Klieber
& Snavely,
2016)
Repair Missing
Function-Level
Access Control
First order logic solver Uses first order logic solver to prove access
controls are safe and, if not, add the ap-
propriate condition. This vulnerability type
is one of top 10 on OWASP list (OWASP,
2017).
(Le et al.,
2017)
Repair vulnerable
code using pro-
gramming by ex-
amples
Inductive Synthesis,
Symbolic Execution
Sets up search space to find quality repairs
to code and tests candidate fixes using test
cases.
(Draper,
2017)
Uses ML to elimi-
nate found vulner-
abilities
Neural network This is not a scientific paper, but their ap-
proach is described more in (Jagannathan,
2017). Learn over large code corpus how to
repair programs.
Table 2. Artificial intelligence techniques aimed at automatically repairing vulnerabilities
Specification analysis
Reference Goal AI Techniques Comments
(Bozorgi et al.,
2010)
Predict possibility
and timing of vul-
nerable exploits
Bag-of-words, Linear
SVM
Assess impact and exploitability of new
CVE and OSV vulnerabilities using bag-of-
words and numerical ML techniques from
vulnerability descriptions.
(Pandita et al.,
2013)
Identify permis-
sion sentences in
mobile apps
Part-of-speech(POS) tag-
ging, phrase and clause
parsing, named entity
recognition, semantic
graph, typed dependency
Uses NLP on application descriptions and
determines if permissions given to app are
justified. Bridges gap between user expec-
tations and app functionality to reduce risk
assessment of apps.
(Hayrapetian
& Raje, 2018)
Evaluating secu-
rity features in
software require-
ments
NLP, Neural Network Continuation of (Malhotra et al., 2016)
work learning concept graphs from OWASP,
OSI, and PCI specs and checks software
documents for alignment to specs.
Table 3. Artificial intelligence techniques aimed at discovering vulnerability risks in specifications
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6. Conclusion
While the field of applying artificial intelligence to security
vulnerabilities is rather narrow, there is a lot of interest as
shown by the diversity of papers we have discussed in this
survey. Some of the most intriguing results surveyed include
the ability to detect vulnerabilities in code and specification
for new smartphone applications, a widely visible area of
risk to the consumer community. The potential to automat-
ically repair vulnerable code by learning the appropriate
code transformation could be very useful when enormous
amounts of code need to be reviewed due to the discovery
of a new vulnerability. Also promising is the ability to ana-
lyze an english language specification for security risks with
reference to security standards documents. Advances in
natural language processing and code transformation tech-
niques from fields outside security are creating approaches
which can be applied to security problems. Given the esti-
mated 111 billion lines of software being generated annually
in the world today, automated security techniques which
can be applied before systems are deployed will be critical
for technology to continue to be safely used by consumers,
corporations, and governments.
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